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I dedicate this thesis to the refugee communities who are currently affected by the COVID-19
pandemic. Not only has this pandemic exacerbated their already precarious livelihoods, but many
states, particularly in the Global North, have stopped admitting asylum seekers or processing
their asylum claims, thereby denying them their fundamental right to seek asylum.
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ABSTRACT
Since the 1980s, Western states have denied refugee status for asylum seekers who can receive
protection in a part of their country of nationality other than that of their habitual residence based
on the principle of the internal protection alternative (IPA). Since then, this principle has been
applied very inconsistently. While some jurisdictions require a high level of human rights
protection in the IPA area, others return asylum seekers to such an area despite a history of
significant human rights violations. The question that this thesis aims to answer is: What is the
required level of human rights protection in the IPA area under the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees? This thesis explores the current approaches to assessing the required
level of human rights protection. This thesis then argues for a new approach, which is more in
line with the Refugee Convention. Using a contextual approach of the legal basis of the IPA
inquiry, it is argued that the new approach must assess whether basic civil and political rights are
respected in the IPA zone, as “national protection” under the Refugee Convention entails at least
the protection of these rights. Furthermore, states must assess whether the conditions in the IPA
zone may compel someone to return to the area of persecution, as returning someone an area
with such conditions violates the prohibition of refoulement under Article 33(1) of the Refugee
Convention. This thesis explores how a lack of respect for the rights to work, education and
health may result in someone returning to the area of persecution. This is because in cases where
people do not receive enough remuneration or unemployment assistance to sustain themselves
and their families or cannot afford to access education or health services, they typically rely on
support from their family and community. If they cannot access such support in the IPA area, but
they believe they can in the area of persecution, they may therefore be compelled to return.
Therefore, a high level of human rights protection is required in the IPA area.
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I – Introduction
There has been a marked shift in the way that the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) has been interpreted and applied over
the years by Western states. Until the 1980s, most Western state parties granted someone refugee
status when that person had a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her area of habitual
residence based on the reasons listed in the Refugee Convention.1 As Chimni notes, during this
time period Western states were quite liberal in granting asylum to refugees, most of whom were
“white, male, [and] anti-communist.”2 However, with the arrival of more refugees from the
Global South since the 1980s, Western states have tried to find ways to justify the exclusion of
refugees from international protection.3 One such way was to argue that when there is national
protection available to asylum seekers in their country of nationality, even in cases where they
faced persecution in their area of habitual residence, they do not meet the definition of a
refugee.4 This thesis explores this concept further and argues that the way it is applied now is not
in line with the Refugee Convention and instead calls for a different approach that is grounded
more firmly in the text of the Refugee Convention.
Under the refugee definition as stipulated in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, a
person must be unable or unwilling, due to the fear of persecution because of one the Convention
grounds, to receive protection from his or her country of nationality. 5 It has been argued that
asylum seekers do not meet this requirement if they have an alternative location in their country
of nationality, the so-called internal protection alternative (IPA),6 where they would be able to

1

James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight Alternative as an Aspect of Refugee
Status Determination, in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR‟s Global Consultations on International
Protection 357, 359 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
2
Bhupinder S. Chimni, The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South, 11 J. Refug. Stud. 350, 357
(1998).
3
Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in Refugee Protection in International
Law: UNHCR‟s Global Consultations on International Protection 1, 3 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
4
See James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status 124 (1991); Supreme Court of Canada, Canada (AttorneyGeneral) v. Ward [1993], 2 SCR 689.
5
The relevant text of this provision reads as follows: “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term
„refugee‟ shall apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country
(Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1A(2), Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137).
6
Alternative names of this concept include the internal flight alternative and the internal relocation alternative.
However, I agree with Hathaway and Foster that the term “internal protection alternative” is “a form of words which
more precisely captures the essence of the permissible range of State discretion.” (Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1,
at 358.

receive national protection.7 The history of this notion can be traced back to the 1970s. One of
the first times that this principle was applied was by a Dutch court in 1977, which stated that the
six Turkish Christian applicants in that case could have avoided persecution, as it occurred “only
in a limited area of Turkey.”8 Subsequently, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) attempted to limit the states‟ application of the nascent IPA principle.9 In
1979, it released the first Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In
paragraph 91, it is stated that:
The fear of being persecuted need not always extend to the whole territory of the refugee‟s
country of nationality . . . a person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because
he could have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the
circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so.10 (emphasis in
original)
While this paragraph is indeed phrased in a way to suggest that a person‟s asylum application
should not be rejected because of the presence of an alternative location where this person could
take refuge, it does leave that possibility open through its addition of the last phrase. Indeed,
states began to increase rather than limit the application of the IPA principle, starting with the
German Higher Administrative Court in 1983.11 Appellate courts in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states began to conduct the IPA inquiry soon thereafter.12 As Kelley,
Hathaway and Foster note, this happened at a time when these states were seeking ways to
exclude refugees and how to legally justify these practices.13 As Zimmermann and Mahler
observe, most Western state parties to the Refugee Convention now conduct an IPA inquiry

7

See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 357-360.
District Court of Almelo, Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht (RV) 1977 N 21 [1977] (cited in Jessica Schultz, The
Internal Protection Alternative in Refugee Law 11-12 (2019)).
9
Jessica Schultz, The Internal Protection Alternative in Refugee Law 138-139 (2019) (“According to Gilbert Jaeger,
who was UNHCR‟s Director of Protection when the Handbook was drafted, paragraph 91 was inserted to contain, as
far as possible, the incipient IPA practice emerging in some member states.” (emphasis in original)).
10
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ¶ 91 (1979), available at
https://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf.
11
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 362.
12
See English High Court of Justice (Queen‟s Bench Division), R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT), ex parte
Iznah [1985], Imm AR 7; United States Board of Immigration Appeals, Matter of Acosta [1985], 19 I&N Decisions
211; Federal Court of Canada, Ahmed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993], File No. A1017-92.
13
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 360; Ninette Kelley, Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative: Is it
Reasonable?, 14 Int. J. Refug. Law 4, 5 (2002).
8
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when assessing a person‟s asylum claim.14 It is important to note that almost all African state
parties to the Refugee Convention, which form about a third of all state parties, are also party to
the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa of 1969 (“1969 OAU Convention”), the definition of which explicitly rules
out the possibility of an IPA.15
The IPA inquiry, which consists of determining whether there is indeed an alternative location
in the country of nationality where someone can receive national protection, has been conducted
very inconsistently over the years. In particular, the level of human rights protection that is
considered to be necessary in the IPA area differs from court to court and even the same
jurisdiction sometimes makes different rulings on similar matters.16 In many cases, asylum
seekers have been sent back to an IPA zone where there are serious human rights violations.17
The research question that this thesis aims to answer is: What is the required level of human
rights protection in the IPA area under the Refugee Convention? This question is a very
important one, as the answer will determine the outcome of the asylum claims of many
applicants. If a high level of protection is required, it would disqualify any IPA area in which
there is a lack of civil, political and socio-economic rights.
This thesis argues that a high level of human rights protection in the IPA zone is required
under the Refugee Convention. The IPA inquiry must be in line with other provisions of the
Convention, which means that a human rights assessment in the IPA zone is needed to find
whether national protection is available and it must be assessed whether there are any factors that
14

Andreas Zimmermann & Claudia Mahler, Article 1 A, Para. 2 1951 Convention, in The 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 281, 449 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 2010).
15
The Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of
1969 (“OAU Convention”) has been ratified by 46 states, which is almost a third of the number of state parties to the
Refugee Convention (148) (African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 2 (2019), available at
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36400-slOAU%20Convention%20Governing%20the%20Specific%20Aspects%20of%20Refugee%20Problems%20in%20A
frica.pdf; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol 1 (2015), available at
https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html). The IPA
does not exist under the refugee definition of the OAU Convention, because it states that as long as persecution or
one of the other recognized reasons for refugee status take place “in either part or the whole of his country of
origin,” the person should be recognized as a refugee (Organization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. I(2), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45).
16
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 387.
17
See English High Court of Justice (Queen‟s Bench Division), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Yurekli [1990], ImmAR 334; House of Lords, Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006],
UKHL 5.

3

could compel an asylum seeker to return to the area of persecution. Such factors may include
violations of socio-economic rights. This thesis argues that if an asylum state returns someone to
a proposed IPA area where these rights are violated, that state violates the principle of nonrefoulement, as there is a high risk that the person would return to the area of persecution.
Chapter II of this thesis discusses the two current approaches to assessing the required level of
human rights protection in the IPA area. It analyzes two cases of the House of Lords of the
United Kingdom and two cases of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) of New
Zealand. Based on this analysis, the thesis argues that the latter approach requires a higher level
of human rights protection in the IPA area, but that the argumentation for this approach is not
very strong. Chapter III then goes in-depth on why a high level of human rights protection in the
IPA zone is required under the Refugee Convention. A contextual interpretation of the legal
basis of the IPA inquiry makes clear that this inquiry must consider human rights in the IPA zone
not only because that is an essential part of the meaning of “national protection” under the
Refugee Convention, but also because there is a risk of asylum seekers being compelled to return
to the area of persecution in the case of a lack of human rights protection in the IPA area, which
violates the principle of non-refoulement as stipulated in Article 33(1) of the Refugee
Convention. Chapter IV expands on this latter argument by exploring how a lack of protection of
three socio-economic rights can result in refoulement. Specifically, this chapter argues that when
such rights are violated, people rely heavily on support from their own family and community.
For asylum seekers who are sent to an IPA area in a different part of their country of nationality,
there is thus an incentive to return to the area of persecution if family and community support is
available there, which is likely to be the case if that area was the last place of habitual residence
of the asylum seeker.

4

II – Current Approaches to Assessing the Required Level of Human Rights Protection in
the IPA Area
Since the 1980s, when Western courts first began to apply the IPA inquiry, two distinct
approaches emerged to assess the required level of human rights protection in the IPA area. The
first approach inquires whether the level of protection in the IPA zone is such that it would be
“reasonable” for the asylum seeker to return there and the second approach assesses whether the
level of protection is sufficient under the Refugee Convention. This chapter will explore and
contrast these two approaches and their implications for asylum seekers for whom an IPA is
being considered will be discussed. First, these two approaches will be explored more in detail,
including how they developed over time. Second, two cases of the House of Lords of the United
Kingdom will be explored in which the court used the reasonableness approach. These will be
contrasted to two cases of the RSAA of New Zealand, which has adopted the protection-based
approach. It will be argued, on the basis of these cases, that the House of Lords‟ approach
requires almost no human rights protection in the IPA area. The protection-based approach of the
RSAA, in contrast, requires a much higher level of human rights protection in the IPA zone. This
is more consistent with the obligations under the Refugee Convention, as will be explained
further in chapter III.
A – The Reasonableness and Protection-Based Approaches to the IPA Inquiry
There are two main approaches that judicial authorities use for assessing whether the level of
protection in the IPA area is sufficient. First, there is the reasonableness approach. This
essentially means that it should be reasonable for the applicant to move to the IPA area. This
applies not only to the level of protection in the IPA zone, but also, for example, to whether the
asylum seeker has family residing there.18 As the UNHCR stipulates in its guidelines on the IPA,
it would not be reasonable for a person to relocate if “respect for basic human rights standards,
including in particular non-derogable rights,19 is clearly problematic.”20 With regard to the
18

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Internal Flight or
Relocation Alternative” within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees ¶ 25 (2003), available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3f28d5cd4/guidelinesinternational-protection-4-internal-flight-relocation-alternative.html.
19
Non-derogable rights refer to the rights stipulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from
which no derogation is allowed in time of public emergency under Article 4(2). These rights are the right to life

5

relevance of socio-economic conditions in assessing the reasonableness of an IPA, the UNHCR
is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, the guidelines note that if someone cannot earn a living or
access accommodation and adequate medical care, “the area may not be a reasonable
alternative.”21 On the other hand, the UNHCR considers that, compared to the area of habitual
residence of the asylum seeker, “a simple lowering of living standards or worsening of economic
status may not be sufficient to reject a proposed area as unreasonable.”22 It also appears to call
for a comparison between the living standards throughout the country of nationality: “Can the
claimant, in the context of the country concerned, lead a relatively normal life without facing
undue hardship?”23
Whether or not an IPA is “reasonable” has been interpreted differently by scholars and courts
alike and has led to a significant disparity in the standard of protection that is considered to be
necessary in the IPA area.24 Some scholars have criticized this approach for being vague and
indeterminate.25 Frelick convincingly argues that for the person conducting the IPA inquiry in
the asylum country certain conditions may not seem unreasonable, but they are for the asylum
seeker who will experience these conditions up close.26 Similarly, Hathaway and Foster argue

(Article 6), right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), right
to be free from slavery and servitude (Article 8(1) and (2)), right to be free from imprisonment on the ground of
inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (Article 11), right to be free from being penalized for an act or omission
which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time it was committed and from a heavier penalty being imposed
than was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed (Article 15), right to be recognized as a
person before the law (Article 16) and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18)
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171). Regarding economic,
social and cultural rights, there are also certain “core obligations” that a state party must fulfill regardless of the
constraints on its resources. Some regard these rights to be non-derogable as well. For example, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated in General Comment 14 that with regard to the right to health, it is a
core obligation that a state must ensure “the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups.” It furthermore states that “a State party
cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in
paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable.” (United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) ¶ 47 (2000),
available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html). However, most often the term “non-derogable
rights” refers to the rights listed in Article 4(2) of the ICCPR. See David L. Richard & K. Chad Clay, An Umbrella
with Holes: Respect for Non-Derogable Human Rights During Declared States of Emergency, 1996-2004, 13 Hum.
Rights Rev. 443, 445 (2012).
20
UNHCR, supra note 18, at ¶ 28.
21
Id. at ¶ 29.
22
Id.
23
Id. at ¶ 7.
24
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 124 (2007).
25
See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 386.
26
Bill Frelick, Down the Rabbit Hole: The Strange Logic of Internal Flight Alternative, in World Refugee Survey 1,
23 (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999).
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that what is considered “reasonable” is essentially in the eye of the beholder and that the
subjective nature of this term has allowed courts to pursue migration control objectives under the
guise of refugee law.27 They concede that it is possible for human rights considerations to be part
of the reasonableness-test, but they note that it is problematic that this depends on the subjective
views of the decision-maker.28
Indeed, the reasonableness approach has not led to a uniform approach to the required level of
protection in the IPA area. Some courts which applied the reasonableness approach have
required a rather high level of human rights protection in the IPA zone.29 However, courts have
usually used the reasonableness approach in a more restrictive way. 30 In R v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex parte Yurekli, for example, the House of Lords found it reasonable
for a Kurdish asylum seeker to relocate to Istanbul even though he would not be able to find
employment there.31 Some courts have equated “unreasonable” with “unduly harsh” and have
required quite severe human rights violations in the alternative area before they deemed it
“unduly harsh” to send the applicant to that area.32 For example, the Federal Court of Appeal of
Canada has held that claimants must meet a “very high threshold” to establish that it is unduly
harsh for them to relocate to the IPA area, which requires "nothing less than existence of
conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant."33
The other approach to assessing the required level of protection in the IPA zone is the
protection-based approach. This approach was developed by Hathaway and Foster during the
1990s and, rather than inquiring whether it is reasonable for an asylum seeker to relocate to an

27

Hathaway & Foster, supra note 1, at 387; James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 353
(2014).
28
James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 360-361 (2014).
29
See Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division), HC v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005], EWCA Civ 893; United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales [2005], 418
F.3d 1082.
30
See English High Court of Justice (Queen‟s Bench Division), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Yurekli [1990], ImmAR 334; House of Lords, Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006],
UKHL 5; Court of Appeal (Civil Division), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Robinson
[1997], FC3 96/7394/D; Federal Court of Canada, Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) [1993], A-81-92.
31
English High Court of Justice (Queen‟s Bench Division), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Yurekli [1990], ImmAR 334.
32
See Court of Appeal (Civil Division), R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Robinson [1997],
FC3 96/7394/D; Federal Court of Canada, Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
[1993], A-81-92.
33
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001], A348-99.
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IPA area, seeks to assess whether there is a sufficient level of protection in that area under the
Refugee Convention.34 In order to determine what this level should be, Hathaway and Foster
looked at the preamble of the Refugee Convention to determine the meaning of the word
“protection.”35 The preamble mentions that the key aim of the Refugee Convention is to “extend
the scope of and the protection accorded by [previous international agreements relating to the
status of refugees] by means of a new agreement.”36 They conclude, therefore, that “protection”
in the Refugee Convention refers to the type of legal rights that are set out by the Refugee
Convention in Articles 2 to 33.37 In practice, this means that in the IPA area, basic civil, political
and socio-economic rights such as the right of association, to employment and health care should
be protected as well.38 Hathaway incorporated this rule in the Michigan Guidelines on the
Internal Protection Alternative in 1999, which were intended to guide states in how to conduct
IPA inquiries.39
This approach has been criticized by Marx, who makes a persuasive argument that the rights
enshrined in the Refugee Convention cannot easily be transposed to the IPA inquiry. 40 This is
because these rights are not absolute, but measured against the situations of others.41 For
example, the right to employment, as stipulated in Article 17 of the Convention, should be
fulfilled to the extent that refugees are treated in the same way as “nationals of a foreign country
in the same circumstances.”42 Indeed, such a right cannot be translated to the context of an IPA
in the country of nationality. While I agree with Hathaway and Foster that a protection-based
approach is to be preferred above the reasonableness approach, I do not believe that the argument
deployed by Hathaway and Foster, as to why the protection-based approach should be used, is
convincing. Chapter III will offer a different justification for why a high level of protection is
required in the IPA area.

34

Hathaway & Foster, supra note 28, at 354.
Id. at 355.
36
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees preamble, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
37
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 28, at 355.
38
Id. at 356.
39
James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative, 21 Mich. J. Int‟l L. 134, 134
(1999).
40
Reinhard Marx, The Criteria of Applying the “Internal Flight Alternative” Test in National Refugee Status
Determination Procedures, 14 Int. J. Refug. Law 179, 204 (2002).
41
Id.
42
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 17(1), Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
35
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B – The Reasonableness Approach of the House of Lords and the Protection-Based
Approach of the RSAA
The reasonableness approach is by far the most commonly used approach in IPA inquiries. It is
used not only by the UNHCR, which applies it in the 50 to 60 states in which it conducts refugee
status determination on behalf of the local governments,43 but also by the vast majority of asylum
authorities and courts in Western states.44 The courts of the United Kingdom have applied the
reasonableness approach since they first started conducting IPA inquiries in the mid-1980s.45
One of these courts was the House of Lords, which functioned as the final court of appeal in the
United Kingdom, until the newly established Supreme Court took over that function in 2009.46
This chapter will examine two cases of the House of Lords, namely Januzi v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department (“Januzi”) and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AH
(Sudan) (“AH (Sudan)”). The reasons that these two cases are explored is that in these
judgments, the House of Lords elaborated quite extensively on the level of protection necessary
in the IPA area. Therefore, an examination of these cases will allow for a better understanding of
what the reasonableness approach entails in practice and which implications it has for the
required level of human rights protection in the IPA zone.
The protection-based approach has only been adopted by the RSAA of New Zealand. 47 The
RSAA decided on the appeals of asylum applicants who had been rejected by the Refugee Status
Branch of the New Zealand Immigration Service.48 In 2010, it was replaced by the Immigration
and Protection Tribunal.49 The RSAA used the reasonableness approach for the IPA inquiry
43
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between 1991 and 1999, when it adopted the protection-based approach.50 Two cases of this
authority will be analyzed in this chapter: Refugee Appeal No. 71684/99 (“71684/99”) and
Refugee Appeal No. 76044 (“76044”). 71684/99 is significant, in that it was the first case in
which the RSAA used the protection-based approach. In 76044 the RSAA gave a response to the
House of Lords‟ rulings in Januzi and AH (Sudan).
1. Januzi
On February 15, 2006, the House of Lords issued the judgment in Januzi.51 The case involved
appeals by four appellants.52 Januzi was an Albanian Kosovar who had fled ethnic cleansing in
his home town Mitrovica in Kosovo.53 The three other appellants, Hamid, Gaafar and
Mohammed, were all non-Arab Darfuris who had fled Darfur because of persecution by Arab
tribes.54 For all of them, the asylum application had been rejected on the grounds that there was
an IPA in their country of nationality, with Pristina being considered an IPA for Januzi and
Khartoum for the other three appellants.55
The appellants claimed that it would be unreasonable for them to return to the IPA.56 Januzi‟s
main argument in his appeal was that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate to Pristina as
he would not be able to receive proper medical treatment there for his mental health problems.57
This argument mainly rested on a UNHCR report that stated that in Kosovo access “to medical
treatment by internally displaced persons [IDPs] is limited for anything beyond basic or
emergency medical services by the fact that payment is required at the time of treatment.” 58 It
also noted that there was a severe lack of psychiatric services in Kosovo and not a single facility
where persons with acute mental health problems could receive treatment.59 According to
Januzi‟s counsel, his socio-economic rights would be violated there, not only because of the lack
of available medical treatment, but also because Januzi would “be required to live in a place
where he has no family or friends or community ties, no independent means of subsistence and
50
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no prospect of gainful employment.”60 The other three appellants argued that they would be
discriminated against in Khartoum61 and that, as most IDPs from Darfur who relocated to
Khartoum would be required to live in camps, it would be unreasonable for them to relocate
there.62 The counsel of Mohammed specifically noted that IDPs in Khartoum were discriminated
against, risked detention and ill-treatment and that the government was even pressuring IDPs to
return to Darfur.63
Lord Bingham, who wrote the introductory opinion of the case, noted at the beginning of his
opinion that the “common issue in the appeals is whether, in judging reasonableness and undue
harshness in this context [of the IPA inquiry], account should be taken of any disparity between
the civil, political and socio-economic human rights” enshrined in the international human rights
treaties and “those which [the asylum seeker] would enjoy at the place of relocation.”64 He
acknowledged that some scholars and courts, including the RSAA, had held that the rights as
enshrined in the Refugee Convention should be protected in the proposed IPA area, which he
called the “Hathaway/New Zealand rule.”65
He contrasted this with the approach taken by Canadian courts and the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales, which only require a level of protection to the extent that someone does not
suffer “undue hardship” there.66 He then advanced five reasons for why he agreed with the latter
approach: 1) the Refugee Convention does not define the rights of asylum seekers in their
country of nationality, 2) related to this, while the preamble of the Convention mentions the
importance of human rights, it cannot be implied that this concerns the human rights of asylum
seekers in their country of nationality, 3) the Qualification Directive of the European Union,
which provided some guidance for the Union‟s Member States in the IPA inquiry, did not
mention the relevance of human rights in the IPA area,67 4) consideration of human rights in the
60
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IPA inquiry does not form part of customary international law and 5) considering rights in the
IPA area would “entitle” someone who was persecuted “to escape, not only from that
persecution, but from the deprivation to which his home country is subject.”68 Lord Bingham
also noted the above-cited UNHCR Guidelines, which he called “helpful” as they focus on the
“standards prevailing generally in the country of nationality.”69
Lord Hope, similar to Lord Bingham, stated that whether it would be unduly harsh or
unreasonable for a claimant to live in an IPA area “is not to be judged by considering whether
the quality of life in the place of relocation meets the basic norms of civil, political and socioeconomic human rights.”70 He warned that requiring this would invite a comparison between the
conditions in the IPA area and those in the country of asylum.71 He continued by saying that as
long as the asylum seeker can “live a relatively normal life there judged by the standards that
prevail in his country of nationality generally,” it would not be unreasonable for that person to
relocate to that IPA zone.72 In other words, if human rights are violated throughout the country of
nationality, including in the IPA area, it would still be considered reasonable for someone to be
relocated to the IPA area.
Ruling on Januzi‟s appeal, Lord Hope agreed with the ruling by the Court of Appeal that the
violations of Januzi‟s human rights were present not only in the IPA area, but throughout
Kosovo.73 He specifically noted that “the difficulties, both in terms of their likely effect on him
and also of the availability of treatment for his mental condition should it deteriorate, extended
throughout Kosovo” and that there was no evidence that the issues he “would face in obtaining
accommodation and enjoying other civil, political or socio-economic rights, were not a panKosovo problem also.”74 Therefore, it would not be unreasonable for him to relocate to
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Pristina.75 When discussing the cases of Mohammed, Hamid and Gaafar, Lord Hope noted that,
while the “almost total absence of civil, political and socio-economic rights which those in the
camps experience is not in itself . . . a ground for holding that it would be unduly harsh” for the
appellants to return there, he did acknowledge that they faced a risk of persecution there and a
risk of being forced by the state to return to Darfur.76 Therefore, he allowed their appeals to be
remitted to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT).77
2. AH (Sudan)
After the ruling in Januzi, the AIT reconsidered the cases of the three Sudanese appellants. 78 The
AIT essentially repeated its previous finding that it would not be unreasonable for the appellants
to return to Khartoum and, with regard to the relevance of the level of human rights protection in
the IPA zone, noted that “[a]t most all that can be expected is that basic human rights standards,
in particular non-derogable rights, are not breached.”79 It furthermore held that even if the
claimants would be forced to live in IDP camps near Khartoum, the conditions there are “not
significantly worse than the subsistence level existence in which people in Sudan generally live”
and therefore it would not be unreasonable for them to relocate there.80 Therefore, the AIT
rejected their asylum applications again.81 The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal and
this time, the Court of Appeal ruled in their favor, as it considered that the AIT had made two
legal errors in the way it had conducted the IPA inquiry.82 Specifically, it held that the AIT‟s
argument that the level of human rights protection in the IPA area would only be unreasonable if
non-derogable rights are not protected was an error of law and in contravention of Januzi.83
Furthermore, it held that it was a legal error for the AIT to compare the conditions in the country
as a whole with those in the IPA zone, rather than the conditions in the place of habitual
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residence with those in the IPA zone.84 The Secretary of State appealed and the case was
therefore brought before the House of Lords for the second time in October 2007.85
In the House of Lords‟ judgment, issued on November 14, 2007, three important points were
made. First, as Lord Bingham wrote in his opinion, the House of Lords considered that the goal
of the Refugee Convention is “not to procure a general levelling-up of living standards around
the world . . .”86 Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Bingham‟s opinion in Januzi that persons who
are persecuted “cannot take advantage of past persecution to achieve a better life in the country
to which they have fled.”87 Lord Brown restated the argument that those who are persecuted are
“in a sense the lucky ones” as they “can escape to a richer and safer country.”88
Second, Lord Bingham, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale did express some concerns about the
fact that the AIT appeared to hold that unless there is a lack of protection of non-derogable rights
in the IPA area, this IPA should be considered reasonable.89 They agreed that this would indeed
be in contravention of the House of Lords‟ judgment in Januzi.90 However, they all expressed the
opinion that, as an expert tribunal, the AIT should be given the benefit of the doubt.91 Therefore,
the Court of Appeal should have respected the decision of the AIT, unless it had been “quite
clear” that it had misapplied the law.92
Third, regarding the comparison of conditions, Lord Bingham stated that the AIT had been
correct in comparing the living conditions in the IPA area with those in the country as a whole.93
Baroness Hale was the only member of the House of Lords who criticized the AIT, as she
considered the AIT‟s comparison of the living conditions in the IPA area with “the lives of the
poorest of the poor” to be the wrong approach.94 Lord Brown agreed with Lord Bingham and
took it further by stating that is not necessary to find that a majority of the population of the
country of nationality lives at subsistence level for it to be considered reasonable for asylum
seekers to return to an IPA zone, but rather if “a significant minority suffer equivalent hardship
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to that likely to be suffered by a claimant on relocation and if the claimant is as well able to bear
it as most,” this person‟s asylum application can be rejected on the ground that it is reasonable
for that person to relocate to the IPA area.95 As the House of Lords held that there had been no
error of law in the AIT‟s judgment, it allowed the Secretary of State‟s appeal and the asylum
applications of Mohammed, Hamid and Gaafar were rejected.96
3. 71684/99
The ruling of 71684/99 was made by the RSAA on October 29, 1999.97 The appellant in this case
was an Indian national who had been living in the Punjab region of India and who was a member
of the Sikh religious community.98 The Refugee Status Branch had rejected his asylum
application on the basis that he could relocate to a different place in India where he would not be
persecuted.99 He argued that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate, because of his prior
persecution at the hands of the authorities.100 Furthermore, he claimed that, because of his
Punjabi accent, he would not be able to live and work outside of the Punjab because people
would be suspicious of him.101
In deciding on the appellant‟s case, the RSAA discussed the concept of IPA at some length. 102
It held that the reasonableness approach is problematic “because of its potential looseness” and
that it “facilitates the intrusion of factors not related to the purposes of the Refugee
Convention.”103 Instead, it held that there must be “meaningful internal protection” which must
go further than the mere absence of persecution.104 It must also form protection against risks,
which “have the potential of forcing the refugee claimant back to the original area of
persecution.”105 It agreed with the view of Hathaway and Foster that the rights listed in the
Refugee Convention provide guidance for assessing the level of protection in the IPA zone.106 It
stated that “refugee status should only be lost if the individual can access in his or her own
95
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country of origin the same level of protection he or she would be entitled to under the Refugee
Convention in one of the state parties to the Convention.”107 The benefit of this approach, the
RSAA explained, is that it allows for a more objective and fair IPA inquiry to be conducted.108
Following this, the RSAA explicitly adopted the Michigan Guidelines as formulated by
Hathaway.109
The RSAA then applied the protection-based approach to the case of the appellant.110 It took
into consideration whether there were risks in the proposed IPA zone which could drive the
appellant back to the area of persecution. In that context, it noted that “Sikhs outside Punjab are
predominantly urban and generally prosperous . . . They control important trades and occupy a
predominant position within the central and regional administration.”111 It also disputed the
appellant‟s claim that Sikhs were viewed with suspicion, and cited a report that stated that “Sikhs
are typically an economically thriving group and tend to be regarded with envy . . .” 112
Therefore, the RSAA concluded that the appellant would not “encounter factors which have the
potential of forcing him back to the original area of persecution.”113
Similarly, the RSAA noted that “the appellant will have the benefit of access to the same
basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights which have allowed the numerous Sikh
communities outside Punjab to generally prosper.”114 Therefore, the RSAA concluded that, as
the appellant could access meaningful domestic protection, he could relocate to an IPA area and
his asylum application was rejected.115
4. 76044
On September 11, 2008, the RSAA issued its decision in 76044.116 The appellant was an Alevi
Kurd from southeastern Turkey who had been forced into marriage and was physically abused by
her husband.117 She divorced him and filed an asylum application in New Zealand because she
was afraid that if she were to return to Turkey, she would be killed by her ex-husband, his family
107
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or her own family.118 Her first application, which had been on a different ground, had been
rejected and her second application came before the RSAA.119
The RSAA reiterated that the protection-based approach is to be preferred over the
reasonableness approach.120 It agreed with Hathaway and Foster that the term “reasonableness”
is “vague and open to vastly divergent subjective interpretation.”121 It criticized the UNHCR
Guidelines for maintaining the reasonableness approach and for placing “insufficient emphasis
on rights” in the IPA area.122 The RSAA noted that this is odd, given the fact that the UNHCR
noted in a different handbook that “protection is, fundamentally, about rights.”123
The RSAA then went on to critique the decisions of the House of Lords in Januzi and AH
(Sudan). It first stated that the House of Lords had made a straw man fallacy by claiming that the
“Hathaway/New Zealand rule” consisted of applying in the IPA inquiry the rights regime of
Articles 2 to 33 of the Refugee Convention as a prescription.124 Rather, the RSAA explained that
it was supposed to serve as a guide, from which “decision-makers are to take inspiration . . . as a
way of defining affirmative protection in the refugee context when deciding whether recognition
of refugee status is to be withheld.”125 It also disagreed with the claim made by the House of
Lords in Januzi that the protection-based approach has no basis in the Refugee Convention. It
stated, similar to what Hathaway and Foster also asserted, that because the Refugee Convention
defines access to international protection as entailing the provision of the rights set out in
Articles 2 to 33, the same rights must be used as a benchmark for assessing whether there is
meaningful national protection available to the asylum seeker.126 Furthermore, the RSAA noted
the peculiarity of Lord Bingham first rejecting the “Hathaway/New Zealand rule” and then
endorsing the UNHCR Guidelines which take the provision of civil, political and socioeconomic rights into consideration in the IPA inquiry.127
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The RSAA critiqued the House of Lords‟ approach of comparing the living conditions in the
IPA area with that of the country of nationality at large.128 They illustrated the negative
implications of this approach by citing the AIT‟s decision in AA (Uganda) v Secretary of State
for the Home Department (“AA (Uganda)”). In that case, the AIT held that a Ugandan woman
had an IPA in Kampala, even though she would have almost no chance of obtaining employment
in the formal sector and she would most likely be forced to work as a prostitute. 129 The AIT,
quoting the previously-cited opinion of Lord Hope in Januzi, held that it was still reasonable for
her to relocate to Kampala as there are “many young women” who, “without access to social or
familial networks have great difficulty finding employment and . . . have difficulty finding
accommodation without employment . . .”130 This decision was subsequently annulled by the
Court of Appeal on the basis that “enforced prostitution” does not fall “within the category of
normal country conditions that the refugee must be expected to put up with.”131 The RSAA held
that the protection-based approach would entail a more objective and consistent determination of
whether the level of protection in the IPA area is sufficient.132
After this critique of the decisions by the House of Lords, the RSAA applied the protectionbased approach to the case at hand. It first noted that in Turkey there is a lack of available
shelters for female victims of domestic violence such as the appellant. 133 It noted that the
appellant, because of her ethnicity, gender, age and lack of education would face significant
problems in finding shelter, employment and food.134 It cited a report on the prevailing
discrimination in the Turkish labor market to support that claim.135 It noted that in these
circumstances, “there is a real risk that the appellant might feel driven to seek the assistance of
her family in the hope that on seeing her predicament they will withdraw the threats to kill her
and offer assistance.”136 The likelihood of this was particularly great because of the lack of
protection of socio-economic rights in Turkey, including the requirement that someone needs to
be legally employed, self-employed or the dependent of someone in that situation in order to be
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covered by a social security program.137 For these reasons, the RSAA ruled that the level of
protection in the proposed IPA zone was insufficient and that she should be granted asylum in
New Zealand.138
5. Discussion
From these four cases, the vast differences between the reasonableness and protection-based
approaches become clear. The House of Lords, which used the reasonableness approach in
Januzi and AH (Sudan), rejected the appeal cases of all four appellants on the basis that it would
be “reasonable” for them to return to the IPA area. It dismissed the relevancy of human rights
protection in the IPA zone beyond that of the protection of rights which are enjoyed by people
throughout the country of nationality, even if that is a very low level. Lord Brown took it further
and held that as long as the conditions in the IPA zone are no more harsh as those experienced by
a significant minority of the country of nationality, it should still be considered reasonable for
them to relocate to the IPA zone.
This approach requires only a very low level of human rights protection in the IPA area for it
to be considered “reasonable” for someone to relocate there, as it compares the level of human
rights protection in the proposed IPA area with the situation of those who face the most hardship
in the country of nationality. As the House of Lords‟ comments on the AIT‟s decision on the
appeals of Mohammed, Hamid and Gaafar show, it appears that as long as non-derogable rights
are protected in the IPA zone, it would already be reasonable for someone to relocate there.
The reasonableness approach as it is currently applied in the IPA inquiry makes this inquiry
very arbitrary, because it is unclear what would count as the type of hardship that someone is “as
well able to bear . . . as most,” and what does not. The cases of AA (Uganda), Januzi and AH
(Sudan) reflect this. The AIT considered in AA (Uganda) that enforced prostitution is a type of
hardship that someone can be expected to put up with, while the Court of Appeal disagreed. The
House of Lords, in the cases of Januzi and AH (Sudan), evidently considered that a lack of
access to basic medical treatment for mental health problems and a life below subsistence level
in an IDP camp with a high incidence of discrimination and detention are the types of hardship
that ought to be put up with.
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The critique made by Hathaway and Foster that the reasonableness approach facilitates the
pursuit of migration control objectives by courts certainly seems valid for the judgments by the
House of Lords in Januzi and AH (Sudan). First, the requirement of only a low level of human
rights protection in the IPA area would enable the court to reject a large number of asylum
seekers from the Global South. Second, the House of Lords made it quite explicit in its
judgments that the fact that someone would, as a result of persecution, gain legal access to a
country with higher living standards through asylum, should have a negative bearing on the
asylum application of that person. Human rights violations in the IPA area would not suffice for
it to be considered unreasonable for asylum seekers to relocate there as that would allow asylum
seekers to “take advantage of past persecution to achieve a better life in the country to which
they have fled,” in Baroness Hale‟s words.
The RSAA took a very different approach in 71684/99 and 76044. Instead of inquiring
whether it would be “reasonable” for someone to relocate to the IPA area or whether the
conditions in the IPA area were more or less deplorable than those experienced by “a significant
minority of the population,” the RSAA posed the question of whether the level of protection was
sufficient under the Refugee Convention. It used the rights listed in Articles 2 to 33 of the
Convention as a benchmark. It also looked at whether any risks would emerge in the proposed
IPA zone that might cause someone to return back to the area of persecution.
This approach requires a higher level of human rights protection in the proposed IPA zone. As
Articles 2 to 33 of the Refugee Convention contain many basic civil, political and socioeconomic rights, these must be respected in the IPA area as well. In the case of the Punjabi
appellant, the RSAA found that most Sikhs who live outside of Punjab are prosperous and
enjoyed the type of rights contained in the Refugee Convention. However, in the case of the
Alevi Kurd, it was considered that she, as a divorced woman, would find it difficult to access
employment and, as a result, social security benefits. Therefore, there was meaningful protection
available in the IPA area for the Punjabi appellant, but not for the Kurdish appellant.
Furthermore, because of the protection of the type of rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention
in the IPA area for the Punjabi appellant and the lack of protection of these rights in the IPA area
for the Kurdish appellant, the RSAA also concluded that there would be a low risk of the Punjabi
appellant being forced to return to the area of persecution and a high risk for the Kurdish
appellant.
20

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that there are political factors that influenced the House
of Lords and the RSAA in their decisions to use the approaches that they did. For example, the
fact that a significant lower number of asylum applications are made annually in New Zealand
compared to the United Kingdom made it easier politically for the RSAA to adopt the more
lenient protection-based approach. In the United Kingdom, there were 23,608 asylum
applications in 2006 and 23,431 applications in 2007, the years of the House of Lords‟ rulings in
Januzi and AH (Sudan) respectively.139 In contrast, the number of annual asylum applications in
New Zealand has been consistently lower than 500 since 2003.140 Even taking into consideration
the fact that the population of the United Kingdom is approximately 13 times the size of New
Zealand,141 there is still relatively speaking a much lower number of asylum applications in New
Zealand than in the United Kingdom. This does not justify the House of Lords‟ usage of the
reasonableness approach, but it does help explain why the House of Lords used an approach that
leads to more rejections of asylum applications on the grounds of the existence of an IPA in the
country of nationality, while the RSAA of New Zealand used the more lenient protection-based
approach.
C – Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the two current approaches to how to assess the required level of
human rights protection in a proposed IPA area. It examined two cases of the House of Lords in
which the reasonableness approach was used and two cases of the RSAA in which the
protection-based approach was taken. On the basis of these cases, it can be said that the
reasonableness approach by the House of Lords requires a lower level of human rights protection
in the IPA zone, as it compares the living conditions there with the rest of the country. In
contrast, the protection-based approach requires a higher level of human rights compliance as it
seeks to determine whether the types of human rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention are
fulfilled.
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III – Why a High Level of Human Rights Protection in the IPA Area is Required under the
Refugee Convention
As the previous chapter has shown, the two current approaches to assessing the required level of
human rights protection in the IPA area lead to very different requirements. This chapter will
argue that the Refugee Convention requires a high level of human rights protection in the IPA
zone. For this argument, this chapter relies on a contextual interpretation of Article 1A(2), which
forms the legal basis of the IPA inquiry. It will be argued that the IPA inquiry should be in line
with the other provisions of the Refugee Convention as well.
However, unlike the line of argumentation followed by some academic scholars, 142 this
chapter considers not just the preamble of the Convention, but the Convention as a whole.
Specifically, it argues that the IPA inquiry must be in line with Article 1C(5) and Article 33(1).
The former stipulates that someone‟s refugee status can be revoked when protection has become
available to that person in the country of nationality and the latter prohibits state parties from
returning persons to an area where they would face persecution. It will be argued that both of
these provisions are relevant for the IPA inquiry and, using sources on how these provisions have
been interpreted, the legal requirements of an IPA under the Refugee Convention will be defined.
This chapter will first address why a contextual interpretation is important to understand legal
provisions in general and provisions of the Refugee Convention in specific. Second, the linkage
between the legal basis of the IPA inquiry and Article 1C(5) will be explained and how this
provision can inform the IPA inquiry. Third, the relevance of Article 33(1) in the context of the
IPA will be explained. The concept of indirect refoulement will be explained and how it relates
to the IPA inquiry. Finally, the types of actions that amount to refoulement will be explained,
again making a link to how that should guide the IPA inquiry. All in all, it will be argued that a
contextual interpretation of Article 1A(2) shows that, for there to be an IPA within the meaning
of the Refugee Convention, a high level of human rights protection in that area is required.
A – The Importance of a Contextual Interpretation of Article 1A(2)
142
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1. Context as Part of the Means of Interpretation
There are multiple approaches to the interpretation of legal provisions such as Article 1A(2). The
three approaches thar are particularly relevant for the interpretation of international legal
provisions are the grammatical or textual approach, the systematic approach, and the teleological
approach.143 The textual approach essentially interprets a treaty provision by looking at the
ordinary meaning of the contents of that provision.144 The systematic approach seeks to interpret
a legal provision by looking at the context of that provision.145 Finally, the teleological approach
examines the treaty‟s object and purpose when interpreting a provision of that treaty. 146 These
means of interpretation are not mutually exclusive. They can be, and have often been, used
together by courts to interpret legal provisions.147
The rules of interpretation in international law are codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT), which entered into force in 1980.148 Although this agreement has not
been ratified by all states149 and includes a provision that stipulates that it does not apply to
treaties that had entered into force before the VCLT,150 it is now considered that the rules of
interpretation as stipulated in the VCLT reflect customary international law which means that
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they are binding on all states and that those rules predate the VCLT itself.151 These rules are
listed in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Convention. For the purpose of this thesis, Article 31 in
particular is relevant as it lays out the general rule of interpretation. It stipulates that:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
a. Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
b. Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
a. Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.152
Article 32 focuses on supplementary means of interpretation, “including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,” but this provision stipulates that these means
can only be used if the interpretation of a provision according to Article 31 “[l]eaves the meaning
ambiguous or obscure” or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”153
Indeed, in practice international courts are hesitant to resort to the supplementary means of
interpretation, other than for the purpose of confirming the meaning given to a provision by
means of the general rule of interpretation listed in Article 31. 154 The International Court of
Justice (ICJ), for instance, has held that the preparatory work of a treaty should not be used for
the interpretation of that treaty when its text is sufficiently clear. 155 It is also important to note
151
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that, while the intention of the drafters of an international agreement certainly is relevant for the
interpretation, it should be considered along with how a provision has subsequently been applied
by the state parties to that treaty.156 This is why Article 31(3)(b) was included in the VCLT,
which requires the application of a treaty after its entry into force to be taken into consideration
for its interpretation.157 Article 33 discusses the interpretation of treaties which were
authenticated in multiple languages,158 which is not relevant for this thesis.
As is clear from the wording of Article 31, the VCLT combines the three aforementioned
approaches to interpretation.159 It is important to note that Article 31 does not place the rules of
interpretation in a hierarchy, but rather lists them as steps which need to be taken when
interpreting a provision.160 Therefore, when interpreting a legal provision a holistic approach
needs to be taken which takes various factors into consideration, including the context of the
provision.161 As stated in Article 31, the context of the treaty includes the text of the treaty as a
whole, including its preamble and annexes.
The importance of a provision‟s context for its interpretation has been underlined by judicial
authorities.162 An illustrative example of this is how the ICJ interpreted a legal provision in
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization.163 The ICJ held that a word “obtains its meaning from the context in which it is
used.”164 It interpreted the meaning of the word “elected” in one of the provisions in the context
of the Convention in question as a whole, by referring to how the word had been interpreted in
different provisions of the same Convention.165 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights
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(ECtHR) held in Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom, when referring to the European Convention
on Human Rights and its Protocols, that these instruments “must be read as a whole” and that “a
matter dealt with mainly by one of their provisions may also, in some of its aspects, be subject to
other provisions thereof.”166
2. Contextual Interpretation in International Refugee Law
As the rules of interpretation form part of customary international law, they can be applied to the
Refugee Convention as well, despite the fact that it preceded the VCLT.167 Indeed, courts have
used these rules to interpret provisions of the Refugee Convention.168 In doing so, many judicial
authorities have used the context of the Convention, including its articles and preamble.
Interestingly, the House of Lords affirmed in Januzi that the provisions of the Convention “must
be read as a whole, in the context of the Convention as a whole, taking account of the
Convention‟s historical setting and its objects and purposes, to be derived from its articles, and
also from the recitals of its preamble.”169 This chapter argues that while the House of Lords was
correct in stating this, it did not actually properly place the legal basis of the IPA inquiry in the
context of the Refugee Convention.
An illustrative example of how courts have analyzed the context of a legal provision of the
Refugee Convention is the case of Zaoui before the New Zealand Supreme Court. As the
approach of this chapter is similar to the Supreme Court‟s, this case warrants further
examination. In Zaoui, the Supreme Court had to interpret the meaning of Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention, which forms the exception to the general prohibition of refoulement. This
provision can only be applied in cases where the refugee is considered to form a danger to the
security of the asylum country or has been convicted “of a particularly serious crime.” 170 The
Director of Security of New Zealand had ordered the expulsion of the claimant, Mr. Zaoui, under
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that provision.171 When Mr. Zaoui‟s case reached the Supreme Court, the Court sought to
establish whether Article 33(2) requires a balancing test between the security risk that an
individual poses and the dangers that this individual would face as a result of the deportation.172
In order to do this, the Court applied the rules of the VCLT and placed the provision in the
context of the Convention as a whole.173 Specifically, it compared Article 33(2) to Article
1F(b).174 The latter stipulates that a person “with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that . . . he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee” shall be excluded from refugee status.175
Thus, similar to Article 33(2), this provision deals with the issue of when someone can be
excluded from refugee protection due to the commission of crimes, which is why the Supreme
Court found it relevant to analyze this provision to gain a better understanding of the meaning of
Article 33(2).176 It held that, since there is no balancing test required for Article 1F(b), it is not
likely to apply to Article 33(2) either.177
B – Interpretation of the IPA Inquiry under Article 1A(2)
This chapter will now make an in-depth analysis of the interpretation of Article 1A(2), the
provision which forms the legal basis for the IPA inquiry. The relevant part of this provision
states that:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person
who:
...
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country178 (emphasis added)
As explained in the introduction, the IPA inquiry is essentially about establishing whether or not
a person can receive protection in the country of nationality in a different area than where the
171
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person is facing persecution. However, Article 1A(2) itself is not clear about the level of
protection that would be required in this IPA area. This chapter will interpret this clause using
the means listed in Article 31 of the VCLT.179 Special attention will be given to the context of
Article 1A(2). There are four main reasons for why the context is more helpful in determining
the requirements of the IPA inquiry under this provision than the other means listed in Article
31. First, interpreting this inquiry using the ordinary meaning of the word “protection” does not
help much, as this word has different meanings according to the context in which it is used.180
Second, the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention and how this relates to the IPA
inquiry is also not very clear. As McAdam notes, “it is possible to discern various, and possibly
conflicting, objects and purposes from the Preamble to the 1951 Convention.”181 Third, state
practice is not very helpful for the interpretation of Article 1A(2), as the IPA inquiry has been
applied differently by different states.182 While it is true that a significant number of state parties
to the Refugee Convention are applying the reasonableness approach, the way that it is being
applied is so different from state to state that it does not shed light on the interpretation of Article
1A(2). As seen in chapter II, even within the same court judges have very different
interpretations of what level of national protection makes it reasonable for someone to relocate to
the IPA area. For example, Baroness Hale considered it wrong to compare the living conditions
in the IPA area with those of the “poorest of the poor,” while Lord Brown considered it
reasonable for someone to relocate as long as the conditions in the IPA zone were similar to
those faced by a significant minority of the population.183 Instead, in order to get a better
understanding of the meaning of “protection” in Article 1A(2), this chapter will place it in the
context of the Refugee Convention as a whole. Specifically, a comparison will be made to
Article 1C(5), which also deals with the matter of national protection and Article 33(1), which
179
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prohibits refoulement which encompasses actions that directly or indirectly lead to a person
returning to an area of persecution, including, as this thesis argues, returning someone to an area
inside the country of nationality with a low level of human rights protection. Given the fact that
the way that Article 1A(2) is to be applied must at least be consistent with the rest of the Refugee
Convention, it is helpful to see how other relevant provisions of the Convention have been
interpreted and how that should inform the IPA inquiry.
Finally, a possible counterargument to the argument made in this chapter is that the way that
the IPA inquiry is currently being conducted shows the emergence of a new rule in customary
international law. If true, this would supersede the rules listed in the Refugee Convention
according to the principle of lex posterior derogat priori.184 According to this principle, any rule
of international law that emerged after an earlier rule that covers the same issue, supersedes the
earlier rule.185 For a rule to become part of customary international law, two elements are
required: “an established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States” and opinio
juris sive necessitatis, which essentially means that the practice must be “evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.” 186
However, there is no widespread and uniform state practice that confirms the emergence of a
new rule. As discussed earlier, although a significant number of Western state parties do apply
the reasonableness approach, they apply it in many different ways. Furthermore, a significant
number of state parties do not even conduct an IPA inquiry, as they have agreed in a more recent
agreement, namely the 1969 OAU Convention, that as long as persecution occurs in a part of the
country of nationality and someone has been compelled to flee as a result of that persecution,
that person is already a refugee.187 As this element is missing, it cannot be stated that the
reasonableness approach has crystalized in a new rule in customary international law.
1. National Protection and the Cessation Clause
When the Refugee Convention was drafted, it was made very clear by the state parties involved
that asylum states should only be obliged to provide refugee protection to someone for as long as
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that person cannot obtain protection in his or her country of nationality.188 Therefore, the drafters
included provisions which stipulated when refugee status could be revoked. These are contained
in Article 1C. Under this article, anyone who was recognized as a refugee under Article 1A(2)
can lose that recognition when he or she re-avails him- or herself of the protection of the country
of nationality.189 This happens, for example, when a refugee returns to the country of nationality
and voluntarily re-establishes there.190 The most controversial provision related to cessation is
Article 1C(5),191 which stipulates that the status of a refugee will cease when this person “can no
longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality.”192 In practice, this provision has often been used by states as a justification for
sending back refugees to their country of nationality, even if the persecution there was still
ongoing.193
While the IPA inquiry and the ceased circumstances clause are different in that the former
occurs before the refugee status is granted and the latter only applies afterwards, there is also an
important similarity: both the IPA inquiry and the inquiry under Article 1C(5) are essentially
inquiries regarding the protection available in the country of nationality. For Article 1C(5), this is
because a lack of persecution means that there is national protection available, as persecution
consists of both the risk of serious harm and the lack availability of national protection. 194 In
other words, if there is national protection available, there is no persecution.
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The UNHCR has stated that states should be cautious when applying Article 1C(5), as the
revocation of refugee status may cause the former refugee to return to the country of
nationality.195 Therefore, there is a risk of refoulement, especially if the conditions in the country
of nationality have not been properly assessed. The UNHCR, which has the mandate to supervise
the application of the Refugee Convention,196 has drafted a series of guidelines on how it
interprets the ceased circumstances clause.197 While the UNHCR‟s guidelines are legally nonbinding, they are still considered authoritative by most courts and are often referred to in
jurisprudence.198
In its guidelines on when the ceased circumstances clause can be invoked, the UNHCR is
explicit that the changes in the country of nationality must be fundamental, enduring and lead to
the restoration of national protection.199 The first two criteria essentially require changes in the
country of nationality to be substantial and to have lasted for a considerable amount of time. The
final criterion is more relevant to this thesis, as it shows how UNHCR defines national
protection, which is clearer and more detailed than in the context of the IPA, as described in
chapter II.
National protection, according to the UNHCR guidelines on cessation, means that there must
be functioning administrative and governmental structures as well as a system of law and
justice.200 Furthermore, there must be “significant improvements” in the human rights
compliance of the country of nationality, in particular with regard to rights such as the right to
life, liberty, non-discrimination, freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly,
movement and access to courts and rule of law.201 Also, the judiciary must be independent with
fair and open trials as well as a presumption of innocence. 202 This is significant, because this is a
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higher human rights standard than simply the absence of persecution, which would only require
the most basic human rights to be protected.203
The UNHCR guidelines on cessation do not require the protection of socio-economic rights in
the country of nationality before refugee status can be revoked. This is because violations of
these rights are generally not considered to amount to persecution under the Refugee
Convention.204 Therefore, “protection” within the meaning of Article 1A(2) does not require the
protection of these rights. However, this does not mean that these rights do not need to be
protected in an IPA area. This is because there is an important difference between the ceased
circumstances clause and the IPA. In the former, the protection must be available throughout the
country. As the UNCHR has stipulated in its guidelines, changes that affect “only part of the
territory should not, in principle, lead to cessation of refugee status.”205 This is different from the
IPA, in which there is protection available in only part of the country of nationality. As chapter
IV will explain, a lack of protection of socio-economic rights in an IPA area may compel persons
to return to the area of persecution. There is no such risk in the context of the ceased
circumstances clause, as the protection must be available throughout the territory. This chapter
will now explore the principle of non-refoulement and argue that asylum states, by returning
persons to an IPA zone where there is a lack of protection of such rights, may violate the
prohibition of non-refoulement.
2. Article 33(1) and Indirect Refoulement
One of the core obligations of the Refugee Convention is the duty to not return or refoul anyone
to an area where that person would face persecution. This duty is enshrined in Article 33(1),
which stipulates that:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
203
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on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.206
Before discussing how this provision relates to the IPA inquiry, it is important to note two things
about the principle of non-refoulement. First, Article 33(1) applies not only to refugees who have
been granted refugee status, but also to those without such status who find themselves under the
jurisdiction of a state party.207 This includes those who are still in the asylum application process.
Second, although Article 33(1) contains a different wording than Article 1A(2) regarding
“persecution,” the two provisions are referring to the same issue.208 Some have argued that
Article 33(1) refers to a different group of refugees, namely those whose “life or freedom would
be threatened” upon return, rather than those who face a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted.”209 However, as Weis notes, the terms used in Articles 33(1) and 1A(2) were used
interchangeably by the drafters of the Refugee Convention and were intended to apply to the
same type of harm faced by refugees.210 Therefore, Article 33(1) should be construed as applying
to persons who would qualify as refugees under Article 1A(2), regardless of whether they have
been granted such status by the asylum state.
There is broad agreement that the prohibition of refoulement under Article 33(1) does not just
refer to the act of the asylum state returning a refugee to a place where that person faces
persecution, but also to acts of removal to a state where that person is subsequently returned to
such a place.211 This is called indirect or chain refoulement. This understanding of nonrefoulement has existed since the drafting of the Refugee Convention itself. While a Swedish
proposal to include an explicit mention of the prohibition of indirect refoulement in Article 33(1)
was rejected, the main reason for this was actually that the drafters considered this prohibition to
be already implicit in the wording of this provision.212
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The prohibition of indirect refoulement has been affirmed by various courts, both international
and national.213 They have held that in situations where states share the responsibility for asylum
seekers among multiple states, the state in which the asylum seeker is located has the duty to
prevent the refoulement of that person, whether directly or indirectly.214 For example, while it is
legal for an asylum state to return an asylum seeker to a so-called “safe third country,” which is a
country through which the person traveled on the way to the asylum state, it is considered to be
essential that this third country does not return the asylum seeker to the country of nationality
where that person would face persecution.215 Therefore, state parties are required to conduct a
“rigorous examination” of the asylum policies of the third state.216 Otherwise, as Goodwin-Gill
and McAdam note, the asylum state which engages in indirect refoulement can be held jointly
liable under international law for the refoulement of the refugee.217
In practice, courts have ruled at various occasions that returning refugees with their specific
circumstances to countries that may otherwise be considered safe third countries, is in violation
of Article 33(1). For example, the House of Lords ruled that refugees who flee persecution from
non-state actors cannot be returned to France and Germany, as these countries are likely to return
such refugees to their country of nationality due to their lack of recognition of persecution by
non-state actors.218 Similarly, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal held in Canadian Council
for Refugees v. Her Majesty that the United States was not a safe third country, in part because of
its broad application of Article 33(2).219 Since the United States had a low standard of proof for a
person to be excluded from the protection against refoulement under this provision, this put
refugees at an increased risk of refoulement.220
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The IPA is similar to the concept of safe third country in at least two important ways. First, in
both instances the asylum country has the obligation under the Refugee Convention of ensuring
that the asylum seeker does not end up in an area where that person faces persecution, as that
would amount to indirect refoulement. Second, and related to the first similarity, both the IPA
and the safe third country must have a certain level of protection against refoulement in place.
However, in that regard there is an important difference between the two as well. In the safe third
country, as seen in the aforementioned examples, the protection against refoulement manifests
itself mostly in the characteristics of its asylum procedures and the practice of forcible removal
that accompanies the rejection of someone‟s asylum claim. In the case of the IPA, this clearly
does not apply as the IPA is located in the asylum seeker‟s own country of nationality. This
chapter will now conclude with an examination of what type of actions, other than forcible
removal, amount to refoulement under Article 33(1).
3. Imposing Conditions that Compel a Person to Return Amount to Refoulement
While some scholars agree that the risk of indirect refoulement should play a role in the IPA
inquiry, others take an opposing view. For example, Marx argues that applying the principle of
non-refoulement to the IPA inquiry is problematic, as the “strength of this principle lies in its
strong State-centered meaning and its acceptance by States. It is state action that directly or
indirectly results in refoulement which infringes Article 33 of the Convention.”221 In contrast, in
the context of the IPA, it is usually the individual him- or herself who moves to another place.222
Therefore, he argues that this principle does not apply to the IPA inquiry, unless the authorities
in the IPA area forcibly return the individual to the area of origin. 223 Marx appears to use a
narrow definition of “forcible return” here, in the sense of state authorities removing someone by
physical force.
However, this view by Marx is too narrow a view of the type of actions that amount to
refoulement. As Kälin, Caroni and Heim have noted, the inclusion of the phrase “in any manner
whatsoever” in Article 33(1) means that refoulement includes more than just the act of forcibly
removing someone in the sense that Marx used this term.224 They argue that the “prohibited
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behaviour [under Article 33(1)] can be intentional or non-intentional, and can consist of a
specific action or inaction or acquiescence.”225 They mention “the withholding or reduction of
life-saving assistance (especially food and water)” as examples of actions other than forcible
removal that still amount to refoulement.226 Wouters also argues that the taking of measures that
coerce refugees into accepting “voluntary” repatriation, including withholding of food, water and
other essentials are prohibited under Article 33(1).227 Similarly, Hathaway notes that Article
33(1) is a forward-looking provision: “[T]he duty under Art. 33 is to avoid certain consequences
(namely, return to the risk of being persecuted), whatever the nature of the actions which lead to
that result.”228 Even the House of Lords appears to agree with this notion, as it affirmed in R v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Yogathas that when assessing whether or
not a deportation may lead to refoulement the focus should be “on the end result rather than the
precise procedures by which the result is achieved.”229
There are many examples of these types of violations of Article 33(1). 230 In 2000, hundreds of
Burundian refugees who were living in Tanzania returned to Burundi, despite the fact that the
civil war there was still ongoing.231 Their return was the direct result of Tanzania‟s reduction of
the food rations for Burundian refugees, combined with the “denial of the right to earn a living
through economic activity.”232 Similarly, Pakistan induced the repatriation of Afghan refugees in
early 2001.233 In late 2000 and early 2001 more than 230,000 refugees had crossed the border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to escape the drought and civil war between the
Taliban and the Northern Alliance.234 Many of them stayed in the Jalozai camp, close to the
border. Pakistan decided to bar humanitarian agencies from entering the camps, which led to a
deterioration of living conditions there.235
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Some scholars have argued that states, by returning asylum seekers to an IPA area where
there are conditions present that may compel them to return to the area of persecution, violate
Article 33(1).236 Eaton argues that if the applicant faces destitution or a denial of basic socioeconomic human rights in the IPA zone, she “may be driven back into the hands of her
persecutor.”237 Therefore, he argues that a human rights assessment should form part of the IPA
inquiry.238 Similarly, Ghráinne notes the importance of assessing whether the lack of human
rights compliance in an area may compel a person to return to an area where that person would
face persecution, which would be a form of indirect refoulement.239
A possible counterargument to this view is that, unlike the previously mentioned examples,
the asylum state is not imposing these conditions directly on the asylum seeker. However, the
text of Article 33(1), in particular the phrase “in any manner whatsoever,” makes it very clear
that the focus is on the end result of the actions of states, rather than on the actions themselves.
Therefore, if a state is returning someone to an area where that person would face conditions that
compel that person to return to the area of persecution, this state is involved in the refoulement of
that person. A human rights assessment of a proposed IPA area is thus essential to prevent
indirect refoulement. While the previously mentioned scholars have reached this conclusion as
well, they have not researched how exactly a low level of human rights protection in the IPA
zone could lead to someone being compelled to return to the area of persecution. The next
chapter will address this gap in the literature.
C – Conclusion
This chapter has explored how Article 1A(2), the legal basis for the IPA inquiry, should be
interpreted. As the context of a legal provision forms an important part of the interpretation of
this provision, the context of Article 1A(2) in the Refugee Convention has been explored. In
order to gain a better understanding of the meaning of “protection” in this provision, the way this
term has been interpreted in Article 1C(5) has been analyzed. It has been argued that
“protection” in the IPA area should involve more than just protection of the most basic human
rights and be in line with how that term has been interpreted in the context of the ceased
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circumstances clause. Furthermore, it has been argued that the IPA inquiry should assess whether
there is a risk of indirect refoulement, which, if there is such a risk as a result of a low level of
human rights protection, would violate the prohibition of non-refoulement under Article 33(1).
This is because, even though the asylum state itself is not imposing conditions that would induce
asylum seekers to return to the area of persecution, it is knowingly deporting them to an area
with conditions that have such an effect. As the question of whether or not an action amounts to
refoulement is more about the result of that action than about the action itself, this would violate
Article 33(1). Therefore, for the IPA inquiry to be in compliance with the Refugee Convention, it
must assess whether there is a high level of human rights protection in that area.
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IV – How a Low Level of Protection in the IPA Area May Compel Someone to Return to
the Area of Persecution
The previous chapter has argued that, since the IPA inquiry must be in line with Article 33(1) of
the Refugee Convention, it must consider whether relocating someone to the IPA area may result
in indirect refoulement. This chapter will expand on this and argue that a high level of human
rights protection must be present in the IPA area in order avoid a person being compelled to
return to the area where he or she would face persecution. Three economic rights are explored
and it will be argued that a lack of protection of these rights may, depending on the
circumstances of the asylum seeker, result in the person returning to the area of persecution.
Specifically, the linkages between the rights to work, education and health on the one hand and
the possibility of being compelled to return on the other hand will be discussed. The main reason
that these three rights will be explored is that these rights are not protected in many countries
around the globe and thus in many potential IPA areas, a fact which is considered irrelevant by
many courts because violations of these rights are usually not recognized as amounting to
persecution under Article 1A(2).240 However, this chapter will argue that such violations may
compel people to return to the area where they are from. First, the development and content of
these rights in international human rights law will be discussed, with a particular focus on the
requirements of the provision of means of subsistence in the case of the right to work and of
financial accessibility in the context of the rights to education of health. Second, the chapter will
discuss how there is a lack of protection of these rights in many countries, with a focus on the
lack of decent wages, unemployment benefits, as well as the financial inaccessibility of
education and health care. Then, this chapter will discuss the concept of social capital and its
importance in the context of a lack of protection of the rights to work, education and health. It
will be argued that if these rights are not protected, most people rely on support from their family
and community. For asylum seekers who have been returned to an IPA zone, where they often
240
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live detached from their own community and family, there is a strong incentive to return to their
area of origin, even if they would face persecution there. Therefore, a state which returns asylum
seekers to IPA zones with a low level of protection of these rights violates the principle of nonrefoulement.

A – The Rights to Work, Education and Health in Human Rights Law
Long before the right to work was recognized as an international human right, it was already
included in national human rights instruments.241 The French Constitution of 1793, for instance,
stipulated that work must be provided for everyone and those who cannot work should be given a
means of existence.242 With the emergence of welfare systems in many states in the Global North
in the late 19th and 20th century, these states increasingly recognized that it is the government‟s
responsibility to ensure that there are sufficient employment opportunities for its citizens and that
those who cannot find work, receive support in order to subsist. 243 In 1948, the right to work was
first recognized as an international human right244 in both the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man245 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).246 Since then, it
has been codified in multiple regional human rights conventions247 and, most significantly, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, which has
been ratified by 170 states.248 Both the UDHR and the ICESCR recognize that the right to work
means more than just people having access to employment. Article 23 of the UDHR stipulates
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that everyone has the right to “just and favourable conditions of work and protection against
unemployment,” as well as “just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection.”249 This is also underlined in Article 25, where everyone‟s right to “security in
the event of unemployment” is enshrined.250 Similarly, Articles 6 and 7 of the ICESCR stipulate
that workers have the right to remuneration that provides them with “a decent living for
themselves and their families.”251 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) has clarified that under the ICESCR, state parties are required to take measures to
“reduce to the fullest extent possible the number of workers outside the formal economy,
workers who as a result of that situation have no protection.”252 Finally, those who lose their job
for any reason should receive compensation.253 Although this obligation, as with all economic
rights, is one that must be progressively realized,254 there are certain minimum core obligations
that must be respected regardless of the circumstances that the country is in.255 The CESCR has
clarified in General Comment 23 that this includes the introduction of a minimum wage which
takes the cost of living into account “so as to ensure a decent living for workers and their
families.”256
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For a long time, most countries in the Global North considered education to be the
responsibility of parents and the church, rather than the state.257 This helps explain why the first
major human rights instruments in the West of the late 18th century made no mention of the right
to education.258 It was not until 1936 that, for the first time, the right to education was recognized
in a national human rights instrument.259 The Soviet Constitution of that year obliged the state to
provide free and compulsory education at every level, as well as a system of state
scholarships.260 Since then, it was incorporated in both the UDHR and the ICESCR. More
recently, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which has been ratified by 196 states,
has also incorporated the right to education.261 In comparison to other economic rights, education
was given quite detailed attention in the UDHR. It should be free and compulsory at the
elementary level and “higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”262
In the ICESCR, it was further specified that secondary education should be “made generally
available and accessible to all by every appropriate means.”263 As a minimum core obligation,
state parties have to provide primary education for all and “ensure the right of access to public
educational institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis.”264 “Accessibility” in
these treaties refers to the idea that education must be accessible on a non-discriminatory basis,
physically accessible and economically accessible, i.e. affordable for everyone. 265 The CRC
contains similar obligations, as well as a note that financial assistance must be offered in case of
need.266
Similar to the right to education, the right to health was missing from the human rights
instruments of the late 18th and 19th centuries.267 Tobin notes that this right was first recognized
in Latin American constitutions in the early 20th century, many of them containing the right to
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health care and an obligation for states to take preventive measures regarding diseases. 268 At the
international level, the attainment of a higher standard of health was given greater importance
with the establishment of the Health Organization in 1920 and its successor the World Health
Organization in 1946.269 It was not until 1948, however, that the right to health was explicitly
recognized as an international human right. The UDHR makes only a brief mention of the right
to health, lumping it together with other socio-economic rights: “Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including .
. . medical care and necessary social services . . .”270 The ICESCR contains a separate article for
the right to health and goes further than the UDHR by stipulating that everyone has the right “to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”271 The CESCR
has clarified that this includes an obligation to make health facilities, goods and services
affordable for everyone, including “socially disadvantaged groups.”272 As a minimum core
obligation, states should grant people the “right of access to health facilities, goods and services
on a non-discriminatory basis especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups.”273
B – Lack of Protection of Rights to Work, Education and Health
In many countries, a significant part of the population does not earn enough to sustain
themselves or their families. This is particularly true for persons working in the informal sector,
where the lack of contractual protections makes workers vulnerable to wage exploitation.274 As
the International Labour Organization (ILO) has noted, “many of those engaged in the informal
sector are not able to work their way out of poverty; in fact for many the conditions under which
they work serve to perpetuate their disadvantaged position and the poverty in which they live.”275
In most countries in the Global South, the majority of workers are employed in the informal
sector. The ILO estimates that 85.8% of employment is informal in Africa, 68.2% in Asia and
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the Pacific and 68.6% in the Arab World.276 This, along with other factors of course, explains
why the level of wages in the Global South are very low. Most people earn no more than $1 or
$2 per day, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity. 277 Furthermore, many countries lack
unemployment benefits. According to the ILO, 75% of the world‟s unemployed do not have any
unemployment insurance protection.278 Therefore, the lack of protection of the right to work
means that many people around the globe cannot sustain themselves or their families from their
wage and/or unemployment benefits.
Furthermore, in many countries across the globe, education is financially inaccessible for
most people, in particular education after the primary level. 279 Statistics show that approximately
35% of the world population aged 15 or above did not attend secondary education and 13% did
not attend any education at all.280 A lack of education makes it more difficult for someone to find
employment that would allow them to earn enough to sustain themselves. The importance of
education has been underlined by judicial authorities and scholars alike.281 The Supreme Court of
the United States, for example, held in the landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education that
education is a “sine qua non for the ability eventually to perform a chosen vocation or profession
and, in so doing, to earn a living.”282 Furthermore, as noted by the CESCR, education is one of
the main means through which “economically and socially marginalized adults and children can
lift themselves out of poverty.”283 Although the extent to which education affects the social
mobility of people has been disputed by researchers,284 it is generally recognized that a lack of
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education makes it more difficult for people to find employment and even if they find
employment it is typically a low-paying job.285
Similar to the problem of financial inaccessibility of education, health care is unaffordable for
many people around the globe. This is in itself a violation of the right to health. As noted by
Tobin, a “health system that is beyond the financial means of people cannot be said to promote
the effective enjoyment of the right to health.”286 In many countries in the Global South, mainly
as a result of a lack of public financing, user fees are the main source of financing of the health
care system.287 This has made health care inaccessible for many.288 In Uganda, for example,
although 72% of the population lives within five kilometers of a health facility, less than half of
expectant mothers give birth at official health facilities.289 Inaccessibility to health care
contributes to high mortality rates from preventable diseases, as well high mortality rates among
young children and pregnant women.290 Furthermore, the high costs of health care and the
resulting loss of household income in the event of illness, is a contributing factor to the
perpetuation of chronic poverty in many countries in the Global South.291
C – How a Lack of Protection of Rights to Work, Education and Health May Compel
People to Return to the Area of Persecution
1. Family and Community Support
There are multiple ways in which a lack of protection of the three rights described in this chapter
may compel people to return to the area where they face persecution. The two most important
ways that will be analyzed in this chapter are the presence of family and community support in
the area of persecution for those who do not have sufficient means to support themselves as a
result of unemployment or low-wage work and who cannot gain access to education or health
care in the IPA area.
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The availability of such support depends on the level of social capital one has. This concept
has been defined differently by different scholars, but essentially means “the ability of actors to
secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures.” 292 These
benefits include the facilitation of exchange of information,293 improvement of the quality of
public goods provided by the community294 and the pooling of resources from which members of
the social structure can draw.295 These benefits may be inaccessible if the community in the IPA
area is very different from the one in which the asylum seeker lived in the area from where he or
she fled. This is particularly true in cases of ethnic divisions.
As Kawachi and Berkman argue, people may be excluded from the benefits of social capital
through racial discrimination, for example by residential segregation or labor market
segmentation.296 Similarly, Hollard and Sene argue that the level of social capital is lower in
ethnically heterogeneous communities, which is largely due to the fact that there is typically less
communication across ethnic lines than inside someone‟s own ethnic group.297 Alternatively, a
high level of social capital is not a guarantee of access to resources. In other words, even if
asylum seekers are able to build social networks in the IPA zone, the community may not have
sufficient resources to support their own members. Furthermore, if the family of the asylum
seeker does not live in the IPA zone, it may be difficult for that person to receive support from
them.
The research that has been done on the importance of community and family support in the
absence of decent wages, unemployment benefits, affordable education or health care is rather
scarce. Furthermore, no research has attempted to link the availability of community and family
support with the possibility of asylum seekers moving from an IPA area to an area of
persecution. However, the studies cited in this chapter do give a better understanding of how
important such support is and how poor socio-economic conditions in an IPA zone could lead to
someone being compelled to return to an area where such support is available.
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2. Family and Community Support in Cases of Unemployment and Low-Wage
Employment
Research has shown that in the event of unemployment or poor employment conditions, family
support is an important way in which persons are able to sustain themselves and their family.
This is even the case in countries where there are social safety nets in place. For example, Binns
and Mars show in their study on how unemployed persons in Glasgow sustain themselves that
many rely, at least partly, on support from their kin even though they have access to
unemployment benefits.298 Similarly, Edin and Lein show that single mothers in some urban
areas in the United States who are struggling to make ends meet rely on relatives for cash
support, as well as important non-cash resources.299 Examples of the latter include relatives
offering to take care of their children for free or driving them to their work.300 This kind of
family support is especially important in countries where there is limited or no governmental
assistance. McManus and DiPrete argue that when “institutional features of the labor market and
the welfare state leave individuals exposed to market risk, they may respond by relying more
heavily on family-based strategies of income stabilization.”301 They illustrate this by contrasting
Germany, where the state has a financial safety net in place for persons who lose their job, with
the United States, where the family is an important source of income after unemployment.302
In the Global South, family and community support are even more important. As the ILO has
noted in a report on income security for unemployed persons, financial support from family,
kinship and the community has “always been the main source of support . . . – and usually only –
source in developing countries.”303 Several studies have shown that high levels of social capital
tend to be associated with a reduction in the poverty rate.304 Grootaert argues that someone who
has a high level of social capital, by which he means that the person is involved in the
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community by being a member of local associations, allows persons to gain access to credit,
which is essential in times of financial difficulty.305 In Indonesia, for example, there is a strong
correlation between household membership of associations in the community and household
expenditure, which is likely the result of this increased access to credit.306 Similar research on the
impact of social capital on household income in Tanzania finds that an increase in involvement
in the community leads to a significant rise in the household expenditure.307 Apart from gaining
access to credit, a high level of social capital may help in finding job opportunities.308 This is
because members of the community may know of certain job openings that would otherwise be
unknown to the job seeker.
3. Family and Community Support for Accessing Education
In the event of inaccessibility of education as a result of high financial costs, people may be able
to overcome this issue through financial support from their family and/or community. This
applies not only to education in the Global South, but to any context of high education costs in
combination with little government subsidy for the education. For example, in the United States
most young adults receive financial assistance and housing support from their parents.309
Research has indicated that there is a positive correlation between family income and the college
enrollment of young adults in that family, which is like due to the higher amount of financial
resources available to them through intergenerational transfers.310 In Honduras, like many other
countries in the Global South, there are very few government loans for university students.311
Because of this, most students from poor or “modest” economic backgrounds relied heavily on
financial support from their family.312 While the same may hold true for students from wealthier
backgrounds, tuition fees impose less of a burden on their family‟s financial resources. As
previously mentioned, education is one the main means through which people from poor socio305
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economic backgrounds can move to higher ones. This is one of the main reasons for families to
invest in the education of their younger members. As Grootaert and Van Bastelaer note, when
the family provides financial assistance it is bearing “present costs in order to secure uncertain
future payoffs.”313 For the possibility of children receiving financial assistance from their
parents, the financial situation of the family is clearly important. Another important factor is the
closeness of the ties of the family. Research has shown that young adults who had poor relations
with their parents and family at-large were significantly less likely to be engaged in education
than those who had better relations.314 Similarly, asylum seekers who return to an IPA zone
without their family may find it difficult to maintain contact with their family and while relations
may have been good before, the lack of regular contact may make it more challenging to access
financial assistance from the family.
Community support for education is another important means through which persons can gain
access to education. The clearest way in which this can be seen is the emergence of community
schools. These types of schools are quite common in most countries in the Global South and are
typically constructed, financed and managed for the most part by the local community.315 They
are usually more affordable than government schools, which has helped expand access to
education, in particular among students from neglected areas.316 Also, compared to government
schools, the local community is much more involved in the procurement of school supplies,
which is paid for not only with the financial resources of the community members, but also with
non-cash resources. For example, teachers at community schools in Mali are often paid with
sacks of millet, firewood or services.317 While community schools generally are open to those
who are not members of the community, it may be difficult for them to do well in such schools.
This can be for many different reasons, including language barriers, cultural differences and
discrimination.
4. Family and Community Support for Accessing Health Care
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Similar to the way that individuals cope with financial inaccessibility of education, those who
face difficulties in accessing health care because of financial constraints often rely on family and
community support. Most research on the linkage between social capital and health has focused
on the health benefits that result from social networks, including positive peer influence on
health behaviors, reduction of stress and the provision of social support.318 Relatively little
research has discussed the way in which participation in social networks can allow a person to
gain access to financial resources and material goods.319 However, this is an important means
through which people are able to gain access to health care. 320 Indeed, research on access to
modern health care services in the Ivory Coast shows that, despite the high costs of such
services, many people from low socio-economic backgrounds are still able to access them.321
The main “factor that allows this access lies within the solidarity of parents, friends or members
of a social network.”322 An example of this is family support of the elderly, which is very
common in many countries. In China, for example, adult children are expected to take care of
their older relatives and “provide a wide range of care, including emotional support, financial
assistance, personal care, and health care expenses.”323
However, financial support does not just allow for the problem of financial inaccessibility of
the health care services themselves to be overcome. For many in the Global South, transportation
costs, in particular in cases where health facilities are located far from those in need of medical
help, can be a significant obstacle for persons trying to get treatment.324 As Musinguzi et al.
learned from interviews with community members in Uganda, such obstacles would be
overcome by mobilization of the community, “which meant actively marshalling resources
including borrowing money from friends and neighbours, organizing transport and caring for
„unable‟ community members.”325
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Another important way in which the community can provide support to those who would
otherwise not be able to access health care, is through the provision of community-based health
care. As mentioned earlier, there is only limited government funding for the provision of health
services in many countries in the Global South, thereby making these services inaccessible for
many. Instead, a significant share of health services is provided by the community. As noted by
Hollard and Sene, “basic health services are now in community hands in Sub-Saharan Africa.”326
Similar to community schools, community-based health care typically employs trained local
professionals, is more focused on the needs of the community and is more affordable than the
formal health care system.327 As with community schools, persons who are detached from the
community, for example because of ethnic differences, may find it difficult to access such
community-based health services.
D – Conclusion
This chapter has shown some of the reasons why a high level of protection is necessary in an IPA
area in order to avoid asylum seekers being compelled to return to the area of persecution. While
there are other reasons as well for why people may return to such an area, this chapter has mostly
focused on the presence of family and community support in that area. If there is a low level of
protection in the IPA area, a person may be required to fall back on such support and return to
the area of persecution. This chapter has looked specifically at the ways in which a lack of
protection of the rights to work, education and health would compel persons to return. Given the
fact that, in the absence of decent wages, unemployment benefits, government funding of
education and funding of health care, most people tend to rely on financial assistance from their
own family and community, there is a strong incentive for asylum seekers to return to the area
where such assistance is available, even if they would face persecution there. Even if not all
asylum seekers who are returned to an IPA zone with a low level of human rights protection
would return to the area of persecution, it is the risk of it that makes a state violate the principle
of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention.
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V – Conclusion
This thesis has demonstrated that the Refugee Convention requires a high level of human rights
protection in the IPA area. This is because “national protection” under the Refugee Convention
requires the protection of certain civil and political rights and the prohibition of non-refoulement
requires a high level of human rights protection in the IPA area to avoid someone being
compelled to return to the area of persecution. The finding that a high level of human rights
protection is required in the IPA zone is important for three main reasons. First, it will decrease
the likelihood of people being compelled to return to the area of persecution as it removes the
incentive to do so, namely the disparity in available family and community support between the
IPA area and area of persecution. Second, it will make it less likely that someone who is returned
to an IPA zone will be compelled to flee once again to another place in the country of nationality
or abroad and, as a result, be displaced once more. Finally, it will protect those who have
suffered persecution in their country of nationality from having to return and face human rights
violations once again, even if these violations do not amount to persecution.
As Western state parties to the Refugee Convention have tried to find ways to exclude asylum
seekers from refugee protection, they have violated this Convention by sending back asylum
seekers to areas with a low level of human rights protection. The reasonableness approach that
they have used has also led to vastly different determinations of IPA inquiries. Those who
conduct such inquiries should do away with the reasonableness approach and instead ask
themselves whether the level of protection in the IPA area is sufficient under the Refugee
Convention, in other words, whether it can be said that the protection of human rights is
sufficient to qualify as “national protection” and whether the protection is sufficient to prevent
persons from being compelled to return to the area of persecution. This would bring the IPA
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inquiry much more in line with the Refugee Convention than ways in which the inquiry is
currently being conducted.
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